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Population, Technological Progress
and the Welfare of the North-South Trade:
A Revisit of the Classic Ricardian Model
Abstract. This paper analyzes how the technology progress of the South
country affects the welfare of the North country in a free trade world. Using
the standard Ricardian model of the North-South trade, we show that, im-
port biased technological progress of the South will undermine the welfare of
the North, once the cumulative technological progress of the South exceeds a
threshold. The relative population size of the South to North affects the thresh-
old. Generally, a relatively larger South country has a lower threshold and
the technological difference between the two countries remains even beyond the
threshold. To a certain extent, the findings of the paper offer an theoretical
explanation about the concerns of rising China in an integrated world economy.
Keywords: Free trade, Comparative advantage, Technological progress,
Population, Welfare
JEL Classification: F1
1 Introduction
International trade and globalization offer opportunities for developing coun-
tries to learn from and catch-up developed countries. Many developing coun-
tries have gradually shortened technological distances with developed countries
by imitation, reversal engineering, and technology transfers. International trade
and corresponding benefits depend on the disparity of countries in productivity
and resource endowments. The convergence theory predicts that the dispar-
ity between developing and developed countries in both income and technology
continue to shrink and eventually disappear as developing nations gradually
catch-up developed nations. An interesting question is whether the technology
progress of developing countries is always welfare enhancing for developed coun-
tries in a free trade world. In particular, whether the technological improvement
of developing countries in the areas where developed countries have comparative
advantage, would undermine the welfare of developed countries.
The China threat’s argument is a typical example. The rise of China as a
world economic powerhouse has caused a lot of anxieties among industrialized
countries. It is politician, business people and ordinary citizen who visualize
the threat of emerging developing countries on the living standard of developed
countries. Mainstream economists supporting free trade, however, refute the
concerns as questionable on conceptual grounds and wholly implausible in terms
of data (Krugman, 1994).
A few studies, however, suggest that it is plausible that the catch-up of
developing nations could undermine the welfare of developed countries in the
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world of free trade. Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977) showed that the
international transfer of the least cost technology from the high-wage country
to the low-wage country would reduce the income of the former. Grossman
(1995) argued that, technological catch-up by the less developed country should
improve its welfare while the advanced country might suffer from the narrowing
of the technological lead. The article by Paul Samuelson (2004), ”Why Ricardo
and Mill Rebut and Confirm argument of Mainstream Economists Supporting
Globalization” in the Journal of Economic Perspective, presents an example jus-
tifying the argument. Samuelson employed a numerical example illustrating how
the US suffered after China experienced substantial technological progress in the
sector where the US initially had both absolute and comparative advantage. He
argued that the example was a proof that the United States suffered permanent
measurable loss in per capita real income when China enjoyed exogenous pro-
ductivity gains in the sector where the US initially had comparative advantage.
Samuelson’s proposition challenges the conventional wisdom who believes that
free trade always leads to a win-win scenario for both parties involved.
However, some critics (e.g., Panagariya, 2005) pointed out that the negative
welfare effect was induced by the deterioration of the US’s terms of trade, which
has been known to trade economists since the publication of Johnson (1955).
However, Samuelson (2005) argued that his conclusion was analytically distinct
from the point about self immiserizing trade made cogently by Bhagwati (1958)
and Johnson (1955) and the numerical example broke new ground in providing
a novel money-metric-utility that measured precisely gains of winners and losses
of losers.
Samuelson’s proposition is derived from a special numerical example, in
which the cumulative productivity growth in China wiped out all the differ-
ence in productivity between the two countries so that the basis for trade
vanished. But, no country has comparative advantage and absolute advan-
tage/disadvantage is rare and a matter of coincidence (Salvatore, 2004).
In this paper, we attempt to generalize the analysis of Samuelson (2004) by
using the classic Ricardian model of North-South trade and investigate whether
the win-lose scenario exists under general conditions. The Ricardian model is
the simplest and most basic general equilibrium model of international trade
and provides the platform for the introduction of new ideas (deardorff). We
examine whether the technological progress in the South–developing nation will
undermine the welfare of the North–developed nation even before the compar-
ative advantage between the two nations completely vanishes because of the
catching-up of the South.
Our analysis shows that, once the import biased technological change of the
South exceeds a threshold, any further technological advancement of the South
in the sector where the North initially has comparative advantage will under-
mine the welfare of the North. That there is no comparative advantage between
the two countries is not a necessary condition for the North suffers from the
import biased technological changes. Additionally, the relative population size
between the South and the North affects the threshold. Generally, a relatively
larger South country has a lower threshold. To a certain extent, the findings
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of the paper explain why industrialized countries, especially the US, feel un-
conformtable about the rise of China, the largest developing country with 1.4
billion population.
The paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we set up the model and
present the closed form solutions of the equilibria in both autarky and free
trade. In section 3, we analyze the welfare impact of the technological progress
and the role of the relative population size between the South and the North.
Finally, we briefly summarize the findings of the paper.
2 The Model
Following the classical Ricardian model, we consider a world economy with two
countries: country 1 (South) and country 2 (North). In each country, there are
two sectors: sector 1 and sector 2, which produce good 1 and good 2 respectively.
Labor is the only input for both sectors. The North is developed country and
has absolute advantage in both sectors compared with the South– developing
nation. Each country has many but limited number of homogeneous firms,
seeking profit maximization, and country i has Li > 0 homogeneous rational
individuals, seeking utility maximization under their budget constraint, each
with a unit labor endowment, for all i = 1, 2.
We assume a consumer has the utility function
U(c1, c2) = c
α
1 c
β
2 ,
where α ∈ (0, 1), β = 1 − α, and c1, c2 denote the consumption quantities of
good 1 and good 2 respectively.
For any i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, the production function of a firm in sector j of
country i is
Yij = AijLij,
where Yij is the output of good j in country i, Lij is the labor input, and Aij > 0
is a constant, which stands the technology of sector j in country i.
Labor is mobile freely within each country but not cross-country and all
markets are perfectly competitive. We make a convention that all variables in
the paper are nonnegative.
For convenience, we denote
θ =
βL1
αL2
, κ = ααββ ,
θj =
A2j
A1j
, ∀j = 1, 2.
Throughout this paper, we assume that
θ1 < θ2. (1)
It implies that the North has comparative advantage in good 2 while the South
has comparative advantage in good 1.
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In the following sections, we will first calculate the welfare of both countries
in autarky and free trade accordingly, and then apply comparative static analysis
to exam welfare impacts of relevant parameters.
This model can be considered as a proxy of China-US trade. The South
country represents China and the North the US. Good 1 and good 2 are, say,
T-shirt and computer respectively. The US has comparative advantage in com-
puter production while China in T-shirt production.
When the South and North trade with each other, there are four markets: in-
ternational market for good 1, international market for good 2, and two isolated
domestic labor markets.
Let pj denote the price of good j, ωi the wage of country i, cij the consump-
tion of good j at country i and lij the share of labor employed in sector j of
country i. Now, we define the free trade equilibrium explicitly.
Definition. We say {pj , ωi, lij , cij}i=1,2;j=1,2 is a free trade equilibrium, if
(i) for any i = 1, 2,
(ci1, ci2) ∈ arg max
x,y
{xαyβ},
s.t.
p1x+ p2y ≤ ωi;
(ii) for any i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2,
lijLi ∈ arg max
L
{pjAij lijLi − ωilijLi},
(iii) for any j = 1, 2,
2∑
i=1
cijLi =
2∑
i=1
Aij lijLi;
and for any i = 1, 2,
2∑
j=1
lij = 1.
It is straightforward to verify that if {pj , ωi, lij , cij}i=1,2;j=1,2 is a free trade
equilibrium, then, p1 > 0, p2 > 0, ω1 > 0, ω2 > 0.
With regards to the equilibrium, we have following results.
Lemma. The equilibrium exists and is unique, and is determined as follows.
(i) if θ < θ1, then,
θ1ω1 = ω2 = p1A21 = p2A22,
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l11 = 1, l12 = 0,
l21 = α− αθ/θ1, l22 = β + αθ/θ1,
c11 = αA11, c12 = βA22/θ1,
c21 = αA21, c22 = βA22.
(ii) if θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], then,
θp1A11 = θω1 = ω2 = p2A22,
l11 = 1, l12 = 0,
l21 = 0, l22 = 1,
c11 = αA11, c12 = βA22/θ,
c21 = αθA11, c22 = βA22.
(iii) if θ > θ2, then,
ω1 = p1A11 = p2A12 = ω2/θ2,
l11 = α+ βθ2/θ, l12 = β − βθ2/θ,
l21 = 0, l22 = 1,
c11 = αA11, c12 = βA12,
c21 = αθ2A11, c22 = βA22.
The above lemma gurantees that the free trade equilibrium exists and is
unique. But, the pattern of trade and specialization varies.
(i)if θ < θ1, the South specializes in good 1 while 1 the North produces
both goods. Feenstra (2003) and Deardorff (2007) mentioned this free trade
equilibrium and explained that, it happened simply because the North was
much bigger than the South and the demand of the North would not be met
if it specialized in one good. Examining the condition suggests that, if the
North productivity is much higher in both sectors than the South, it is also
possible that the North produces both goods while the South specializes in
just one when the sizes of both countries are roughly same. The extremely
low productivity of the South could not produce enough to meet the global
consumption if the North specialized in good 2. In this case, the North gains
nothing from trading with the South. It is highly likely that the North does not
trade with the South. This equilibrium explains why many low income countries
cannot export any manufacturing products but resources to advanced countries.
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Their low productivity in manufacturing industry hinders the possibility to trade
with developed countries in spite of the existence of comparative advantage.
(ii) if θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], the South produces only goods 1 while the North produces
only good 2. This is the typical trade pattern derived from the Ricardian model.
Both countries benefit from the free trade.
(iii) if θ > θ2, the South produces both goods while the North produces only
good 2. In this case, the South does not benefit from the trade and only the
North does. This trade pattern is possible if the South is much bigger than
the North and the technological disparity between the South and the North is
relatively small.
In the free trade equilibrium, the corresponding welfare of country 1 and
country 2 are as following respectively:
U1 = κA
α
11
(
θ2
ω
A12
)β
,
U2 = κ
(
ω
θ1
A21
)α
Aβ22, (2)
where
ω = max (θ1,min(θ, θ2)) ,
which is just the ratio of wages.
Similarly, we can define the autarky equilibrium and prove that in autarky
equilibrium, the welfares of country 1 and country 2 are as following respectively:
U∗1 = κA
α
11A
β
12, U
∗
2 = κA
α
21A
β
22.
Furthermore, we can prove that if the condition (1) is replaced with θ1 = θ2, that
is, no country has any comparative advantage, then, there exist a continuum of
free trade equilibria, under which the welfare of any country is the same as in
autarky. Hence, if the comparative advantage disappears, no country has the
incentive to trade.
3 The Welfare Impact of Exogenous Technolog-
ical Progress
Comparing the welfare of the two countries in autarky with that in free trade,
we can derive the results below:
U1 ≥ U∗1 , U2 ≥ U∗2 ,
and,
U1 = U
∗
1 ⇐⇒ θ ≥ θ2,
U2 = U
∗
2 ⇐⇒ θ ≤ θ1.
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We summarize these results in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Comparing with in autarky, any country is better off in
free trade. Moreover, if
θ ≤ θ1,
then, only country 1 is strictly better off; if
θ1 < θ < θ2,
then, both countries are all strictly better off; if
θ ≥ θ2,
then, only country 2 is strictly better off.
Now, we examine how the catching-up of the South affects the welfare of the
North. Specifically, we analyze whether the productivity growth of the South
in sector 2, where the North has comparative advantage at the beginning of the
free trade would make the North better or worse off.
From (2), we know that if
θ ≤ θ1,
then, U2 is independent of A11 and A12. So, in this case, technological changes
of the South have no impacts on the North.
The interesting case is θ > θ1. We focus on two scenarios:
Scenario I:
θ1 < θ < θ2;
Scenario II:
θ1 < θ2 ≤ θ.
In scenario I, the South specializes in producing good 1 while the North
in good 2. So, the South exports good 1 and imports good 2. As the South
experiences significant import biased technological progress, the productivity
A12 increases. Once A12 exceeds a threshold, the world economy enters into
scenario II, where the South starts to produce both goods while the North
continues to specialize in good 2. The threshold is
A∗12 =
A22
θ
. (3)
From (2), we derive the welfare of the North in Scenario I as
U2 = κ (θA11)
α
Aβ22,
which is independent of A12. In other words, the productivity growth of the
South in sector 2 has no impacts on the welfare of the North in scenario I.
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In Scenario II, however, the welfare of the North is
U2 = κ
(
A11
A12
)α
A22. (4)
It implies that the welfare of the North is an decreasing function of A12. Any
further productivity improvement of the South in sector 2 will result in a de-
crease in the welfare of the North.
We summarize the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Once the technological progress of the South in sector 2
crosses a threshold so that the South starts to produces two goods and the
North produces good 2 only, any further technological progress of the South in
sector 2 will undermine the welfare of the North, other things being equal.
It is important to notice that, if there exists a uniform technological progress
in both sectors of the South and other factors are held constant, the welfare of
the North remains the same.
In fact, based on (4), we can easily give a more general result about the
welfare impact of the technological progress of the South in sector 2 in Scenario
II: The North will be strictly worse off, if and only if αb > a, where a is the
growth rate of the productivity in the sector 2 of the North, and b is the growth
rate of the productivity in the sector 2 of the South minus that of the South in
sector 1.
Regarding the magnitude of the threshold, equation (3) implies that the
threshold A∗12 is strictly decreasing with respect to the population ratio of the
South to the North.
Therefore, with a given North country, a relatively large (small) South coun-
try has a relatively low (high) threshold.
Compared with China, Vietnam, for example, has a quite higher threshold
to cross before its technological progress in high-tech sector becomes harmful to
the welfare of the US.
From the proposition 2, we know that even before the South completely
catches up the North in sector 2 and has the same productivity as the North in
the sector, the welfare of the North will begin to decrease as the South improves
its productivity in producing good 2.
Samuelson (2004) argued that, the US welfare would decrease if China caught
up the US so that no country had comparative advantage in any sectors. How-
ever, our analysis suggests that, the welfare of the North would be undermined
by the technological advancement of the South even before the comparative ad-
vantage disappears. The relative size of the two trading nations plays a critical
role in determining the welfare effect of the technological progress of the South
.
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Figure 1: The Equilibria of Free Trade with Exogenous Technology Progress
The results of proposition 2 can be explained by the world relative demand
(RD) and relative supply (RS) curves.
Following Krugman et al. (2015), we draw a diagram of RD and RS curves
under different technologies in Figure 1.
The RD curve is
p =
β/α
q
,
and the RS curve is
p = τ2I(q ≤ q∗) + τ1I(q > q∗),
where p = p2/p1 the relative price, q = q2/q1 the relative quantity, qi is the
total quantity of production of good i for i = 1, 2, and
q∗ =
A22L2
A11L1
, τi =
Ai1
Ai2
, ∀i = 1, 2.
Point A marks the initial world market equilibrium, in which the South
specializes in producing good 1 and the North in producing good 2. Associated
with the technological progress in good 2, Labor productivity A12 increases.
Consequently, τ1 decreases, and the ORS part of the RS curve shifts downward.
Once the ORS is below ARS1, at the free trade equilibrium, the South
produces both goods, and the welfare of the North decreases.
For example, at the position of ERS, the RD curve intersects with the RS
curve at point B, where the South produces both goods.
Once ORS overlaps with DRS3, the relative productivity between the two
countries is equalized, i.e. τ1 = τ2, and neither the South nor the North has
comparative advantage over the other.
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It is worthy to mention that there exists a substantial distance between
ARS1 and DRS3. The distance indicates that the negative effect on the welfare
of the North will emerge far before the relative productivity equalization occurs.
In our model, that no country has comparative advantage is not a pre-
requisite for the North’s welfare being undermined by the South’s technological
progress. Therefore, our result is more general than that of Samuelson (2004).
Actually, the world market equilibrium defined by point C represents the
special case employed by Samuelson(2004). At point C, τ1 = τ2, neither the
South nor the North has comparative advantage. The incentive for trade does
not exist. Thus, both countries move back to autarky. The South’s welfare
increases with the improved productivity while the North suffers.
No technical progress in the sector 2 of the North is another unrealistic
assumption in the Samuelson’s numerical example. Our model could accommo-
date the technological progress of the US. The results will hold providing that
the growth of the South’s productivity in sector 2 is much higher than that of
the North. As the North is the leader in producing good 2 at the beginning of
the free trade and the South is a follower, improving technology through imi-
tation, reversal engineering and technology spillover is far easier than making a
new breakthrough. It is a reasonable and realistic assumption that the South’s
labor productivity generally grows quite faster than that of the North.
4 Concluding Remarks
Using the standard Ricardian model, we generalize the result of Samuelson
(2004). Our analysis shows that, once the technological progress of the South
in the sector where the North has comparative advantage, has accumulated to a
certain level, the South will switch from the complete specialization to producing
two goods, thus giving rise to a decrease in the welfare of the North. The win-
lose scenario (comparing with the initial state of the free trade) induced by the
technological improvement occurs even before comparative advantage between
the two countries is eliminated completely. Even though the welfare of the North
decreases as the South starts to produce both goods, free trade remains a better
choice than autarky for the North.
The analysis also suggests that the negative welfare impact depends on the
relative size of the South. For a relative small developing country, the damage
to the North will not be materialized until it crosses over a very high produc-
tivity threshold. To a certain extent, the results explain why the rise of China,
the largest developing country with 1.4 billion population causes much more
concerns than any other emerging developing countries.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma. One can verify directly that in any one of the three
cases, the given {pj , ωi, lij , cij}i=1,2;j=1,2 is really an equilibrium.
In the sequel, we prove the uniqueness. Or, equivalently, we prove that if
{pj , ωi, lij , cij}i=1,2;j=1,2 is an equilibrium, then, it must be of the form given in
this lemma.
First of all, we show that it can not happen that l11 > 0, l12 > 0, l21 >
0, l22 > 0. In fact, otherwise, we would have that
ω1 = p1A11 = p2A12,
ω2 = p1A21 = p2A22,
which yields θ1 = θ2, we get a contradiction.
Next, we prove that it can not happen that l11 = 0, l12 > 0, l21 > 0, l22 > 0.
Otherwise, we would have that
ω1 = p2A12 ≥ p1A11,
ω2 = p1A21 = p2A22,
which yields θ1 ≥ θ2, we also get a contradiction.
Similarly, one can prove that it can not happen that l11 ≥ 0, l12 > 0, l21 >
0, l22 = 0.
Then, there are left only three cases: l11 > 0, l12 = 0, l21 > 0, l22 > 0;
l11 > 0, l12 = 0, l21 = 0, l22 > 0; l11 > 0, l12 > 0, l21 = 0, l22 > 0.
Now, suppose that l11 > 0, l12 > 0, l21 = 0, l22 > 0. Then, we have that
ω1 = p1A11 = p2A12,
ω2 = p2A22 ≥ p1A21,
p1ci1 = αωi, p2ci2 = βωi, i = 1, 2,
c11L1 + c21L2 = A11l11L1,
c12L1 + c22L2 = A12l12L1 +A22L2,
which yields the solution, coinciding with that given in the case, where θ > θ2.
Other two cases can be treated similarly. The lemma is proved.
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